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Abstract
Stapp has recently argued from a version of the Hardy type experiments
that quantum mechanics must be non-local, independent of any additional
assumptions like realism or hidden variables. I argue that either his conclu-
sions do not follow from his assumptions, or that his assumptions are not true
of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted
level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.
In a recent paper [1] H. Stapp has argued that quantum mechanics is non-local. He bases
this conclusion on a weak definition of locality for a physical theory and an examination of the
predictions of quantum mechanics for a specific two particle Hardy-type [2] [3] experiment.
It was already known since the 50’s from the theorem of J.S. Bell [4] that quantum mechanics
violated the correlations expected in any theory which is both local and is ”hidden variable”
theory, in which the statistics arises out of the lack of knowledge of the values of local hidden
variables which determine the outcome of the experiment itself. However, Stapp’s argument
claims to strengthen that conclusion by arguing that no local theory cannot give the same
predictions as quantum mechanics. Ie, he reaches the conclusion that quantum mechanics
is non-local.
In his paper, Stapp claims that his proof that Quantum mechanics is non-local applies
only if one assumes that locality holds in all frames of a special relativistic system. However
I will take this as a given, that locality is to be taken to apply to any two systems when
causally separated from each other. The temporal order of experiments which are space-like
separated is assumed to be irrelevant.
To begin, let me first present the argument in my own way. Stapp phrased his argument
in the form of a logical calculus, which I will examine later. He considers a very general
situation in which measurements are made at two locations, L (for left) and R (for right). At
each location two possible measurements are made which he designates by L1 and L2 for the
left and R1 and R2 for the right. In this first section I will specify his generic situation by
having the measurements be made on the spins of two particles, one particle labeled L on the
left and the other ,R, on the right. These two particles are placed into a specific correlated
state. For purposes of illustration, I will assume that these are two spin-1/2 particles, and
that in the spin-z basis for each particle, the state is given by
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|Ψ >= N
(
cos(θ)|+ > |+ > + sin(θ)|+ > |− > +1 + sin
2(θ)
cos(θ)
|− > |+ > − sin(θ)|− > |− >
)
(1)
where the state |α > |β > refers to the left particle being in the α eigenstate of its spin-z
operator and the right particle is in the β eigenstate of its spin-z operator. θ is a fixed
parameter, and N is a normalisation given by
N = cos(θ)/
√
2(1 + sin2(θ)).
Writing this state in the form
|Ψ >= N
(
|+ > (cos(θ)|+ > + sin(θ)|− >) + |− > (1 + sin
2(θ)
cos(θ)
|+ > − sin(θ)|− >)
)
(2)
we see that that the |+ > eigenstate of the left particle is perfectly correlated with the
eigenstate (cos(θ)|+ > + sin(θ)|− >)/√2 for the right particle, which is the + eigenstate
of the operator σθ = cos(2θ)σz + sin(2θ)σx for the right particle. I.e., if σz is measured on
the left particle and is found to have value +, and σθ is measured on the right, then it will
always be found to have value +.
Writing the state as
|Ψ >= N((|+ > +|− >)(cos(θ)|+ > + sin(θ)|− >) (3)
+2 tan(θ)|− > (sin(θ)|+ > − cos(θ)|− >))
we see that that the (cos(θ)|+ > + sin(θ)|− >)/√2 eigenstate of the right particle’s σθ
operator is perfectly correlated with the eigenstate (|+ > +|− >)/√2 of σx of the the left
particle. I.e, if σθ is measured on the right and found to have value +, then if σx is measured
on the left, it is always found to have value +.
Finally, we can write the state as as
|Ψ >= N
(
(|+ > +|− >) 1
cos(θ)
|+ > +(|+ > −|− >)(− sin
2(θ)
cos(θ)
|+ > + sin(θ)|− >)
)
(4)
and we see that the state (|+ > +|− >)/√2 of the left particle is perfectly correlated with
the state |+ >, the plus eigenstate of the σz operator, of the right particle.
We thus can construct a chain of perfect correlations. If we have measured σz of the
left particle and found it to be +, then we can predict with certainty that the if we had
measured σθ of the right, the answer would have been +. If we measured σθ of the right and
found a value of +, then we would know with certainty that if we had measured σx of the
left we would have gotten a value of +. Finally if we had measured σx of the left particle
and gotten +, we would know with certainly that we would have gotten the + eigenstate if
we had measured σz for the right particle.
In essence, the Stapp argument is that we can use the logical chain
σLz = +⇒ σRθ = +⇒ σLx = +⇒ σRz = + (5)
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to infer that σLz = +⇒ σRz = + with certainty. However a direct calculation shows that if
σLz = +, one has only a probability of cos
2(θ) that if one also measures σRz that one will
get a value of +. If one chooses θ very near pi/2, one can make this probability as small as
one desires. Ie, the inferred value of σRz , given that σLz is measured to have value +, and
given the chain of inferences via the perfect correlation, is with high probability exactly the
opposite of what quantum mechanics would predict would be obtained in a measurement.
Stapp essentially argues that the truth of the chain of inferred values can be justified by an
appeal only to to locality. Thus, if correct, it is relativistic locality alone, with no further
assumptions, which allows one to carry out the line of inferences. Since quantum mechanics
violates the conclusion of that inferential chain, his conclusion is that quantum mechanics
must be non-local.
Now, if one believed that attributes of a system had values which the measurements
simply revealed, and if measurements made in one causally disconnected region cannot
influence those values of attributes associated with some other causally disconnected region,
then the truth of that inferential chain would be immediately obvious. This is essentially a
strong form of hidden variables theory (where those values can be derived from the values
which some set of hidden variables have in any particular realisation of the experiment),
and this analysis shows that quantum mechanics is in disagreement with such a hidden
variables theory. However, a weaker form of hidden variables theory is that such values are
context sensitive. Ie, that the value of an attribute may depend on the types of experiments
which are actually carried out on the system. This is where the assumption of locality
comes in as a restriction on the types of context sensitivity of the values that attributes
can have. In particular, locality is usually used to argue that value that a variable attains
must be independent of the choice of experiment carried out in a causally disconnected
region (although correlations clearly mean that the value need not be independent of the
values obtained for measurements in disconnected regions). Thus the context for the value
assigned to an attribute can depend on the experiments carried out in the causally connected
region surrounding the experiment, but not on the experiment carried out in the causally
disconnected region.
However within quantum mechanics, attributes do not have values unless those attributes
are actually measured. Thus, if σz of particle L has value +, it is inappropriate within
quantum mechanics to argue that σLx must have some value. It was not measured and thus
one cannot talk about the value that it has. Talking about the the values of non-measured
attributes is termed “counter-factual” reasoning. Clearly the inference chain in eqn.5 relies
on counter-factual reasoning since within the context of quantum mechanics, only one of
a non-commuting set of operators can be measured at any one time. One attitude toward
any such chain of argument would be to disallow all counter-factuals. However, as Stapp
argues, such a procedure would be to disallow reasoning which physicists often engage in,
even in quantum situations. His example is classical, where such counter-factual reasoning
is unexceptional, but quantum examples could also be found. However, in the quantum case
one must be extremely careful in carrying out such arguments, and must ensure that one is
not assuming a form of quantum realism– that quantum attributes have values even if they
have not been measured– together with the counter-factual discussion.
I will assume that such counter-factual statements may legitimately be made in certain
circumstances. Given that one has established a correlation of system A (which since I
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am making a generic argument I will use instead of say L of the above specific example)
with system B (instead of the specific R from above), then one can make measurements on
system B, and on the basis of the known correlations, make inferences about system A, even
if system A has not been directly measured. After all, if such reasoning were disallowed, the
whole of the von Neuman argument about measurement would be invalid. In von Neuman’s
discussion, it is precisely the use of correlations of measuring apparatuses with systems that
allows us to deduce properties of the system from measurements made on the measuring
apparatus, even though no direct “measurement” has been made on the system.
However, great care is required in such counter-factual statements that one does not
import into the statements a notion of reality. In particular, the truth of the statement made
about system A which relies on measurement made on system B and on the correlations
which have been established between A and B in the state of the joint system is entirely
dependent on the truth of the actual measurement which has been made on system B. To
divorce them is to effectively claim that the statement made about A can have a value in
and of itself, and independent of measurements which have been made on A. This notion is
equivalent to asserting the reality of the statement about A independent of measurements,
a position contradicted by quantum mechanics.
Thus in the above system, measuring σθ on particle R and finding value + can lead one to
assigning a value of + to σx of particle L, even if that attribute was not directly measured,
due to the correlation between the two particles. However, that value for σLx is entirely
dependent on the fact that σθ was actually measured and found to have a certain value on
particle R. In particular, causality cannot be used to argue that the inferred (as opposed to
measured) value of σLx must be independent of what was measured at particle R. Although
the two measurements may be causally disconnected, they are not logically disconnected.
The value can be assigned to σLx is logically tied to the actual measurement of σRθ and its
value.
Without the extension of the concept of locality to such inferred values, I will argue
below that the chain of reasoning used by Stapp to establish eqn.5 is broken. In all cases
at most one attribute (either σLz or σLx for the left particle or σRz or σRθ for the right
particle) is measured at each of the particles. That measurement may be used to infer some
counter-factual value at the other particle, but in each case that chain of inference cannot
be extended sufficiently to obtain the conclusion of eqn.5 . Since his argument breaks down,
there is no contradiction between the statement that quantum mechanics is local–ie, that
measured (as opposed to inferred) values must be independent of the attribute measured in
a causally disconnected region– and that the quantum outcomes obey the rules that they
do.
Let me finally examine Stapp’s argument in detail. Stapp postulates three requirements
that he claims a local theory should satisfy. He gives labels to particles, variable and
outcomes, and uses the notation of a logic calculus. He refers to two measurement situations,
L and R which are space-like separated (ie, causally disconnected). These would correspond
to my particles each with spins on the left and right mentioned above. Thus in order to
make contact with his notation, I will assume that the measurement of σz at L is designated
by his specific measurement situation on the left, L1, while measuring σx at L is designated
by his L2. Measuring σz on particle R is R1 and σθ on the particle R is R2. His outcomes
a and b are mapped onto my obtaining the values − and + on L1 or, more specifically, on
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obtaining the values − and + on a measurement of σz on the particle at L. Similarly, c and d
refer to obtaining the value of + and − on L2 (σLx). e and f refer to obtaining values − and
+ on R1, (σRz) and g and h to values + and − on R2 (σRθ). By assumption, L and R are
measured in causally disconnected regions. Thus in all cases one can assume that L (R) is
measured after any measurement is made of R (L) and the free choice of which measurement
is actually made on L (R) should have no impact on the outcomes of measurements made
on R (L).
His locality conditions, in his modal logic calculus are:
LOC1 : Ru ∧ Lv ∧ i⇒ Ru′✷→ Lv ∧ i (6)
or in words, a change in the choice of which experiment the experimenter at R will carry
out does not affect the outcome of the experiment at L where Lv is measured. u refers to
one of 1 or 2, and u’ refers to the other of the two. v refers to 1 or 2, and i refers to one
of the possible outcomes of the measurement Lv. ∧ means “and” and the symbol Ru′✷→
means ”if Ru is replaced by Ru’ in the previous expression”. This definition of locality is
unexceptional if we limit ourselves to Lv ∧ i actually measured. I discuss this further below
when I go through Stapp’s argument step by step.
LOC2 : If (Lv ⇒ [(Ru ∧ j)⇒ (Ru′✷→ Ru′ ∧ j′]) (7)
Then (Lv′ ⇒ [(Ru ∧ j)⇒ (Ru′✷→ Ru′ ∧ j′]) (8)
This says that If, under the condition that Lv is measured (at a late time) at L, one
can deduce that some condition prevails relating measurements only on the right hand side,
Then that relation on the right must also be true if the experimentalist on the left side had
decided to make some other measurement (at that later time). I.e., the truth of a statement
pertaining exclusively to possible events in region R cannot depend on which free choice is
to be made by the experimenter in region L.
I have inserted the ”at a late time” to emphasise that these two measurements are
causally unrelated and thus one can assume that L is measured at a time later than R.
Note that in LOC1, it is R that is taken to be the later, while in LOC2 it is L. Under
the notion of relativistic causality, this is a completely legitimate procedure. Either of two
causally separated events can be taken to be the earlier in relativity. In his paper, Stapp
questions the legitimacy of this procedure. I do not, and see no possible reason for doing
so. In my opinion, if quantum mechanics is to be a local theory it should be local under the
full relativistic definition.
LOC2 can be rewritten as
LOC2 : (Lv ∧Ru ∧ j ⇒ Ru′✷→ Lv ∧Ru′ ∧ z) (9)
⇒ Lv′✷→ Ru ∧ j(Lv′ ∧ Ru ∧ j ⇒ Ru′✷→ Lv′ ∧Ru′ ∧ j)
To me this more clearly states the content of the above principle and says that if from the
fact that Lv is measured and Ru has the value j you can infer that if Ru’ had been measured
instead it would have had value j’ then that inference must by independent of whether you
measured Lv or Lv’.
If it were true that one could deduce solely from the fact that a measurement had been
made at L that some relation on the right hand side must hold, then I would agree that this
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requirement would be reasonable. However, if the truth of the relation on the right hand
side depended not only on which measurement had been made on the left, but also on the
actual value obtained on the left, then no such locality relation would obtain. If it is the
value obtained on the left, even if that value is obtained at a later time, which allows one
to deduce the relation on the right, then that relation on the right cannot be independent
of what it is that is measured on the left, but rather is tied to that measured value. To
assume otherwise, to assume that the relations between possible measurements on the right
are independent of the values of the outcomes on the left which were used to derive those
relations is, in my opinion, simply another form of realism.
Let us now look in detail at Stapp’s argument. Again I will use his notation.
(1)LOC1 : (R2 ∧ L2 ∧ c)⇒ (R1✷→ (R2 ∧ L2 ∧ c)) (10)
On face value this is just the unexceptional statement that if L2 is measured to have value
c, then the truth of having obtained that value is independent of what is (or will be)
measured at R. Ie, if you had thought that R2 was measured at R and you knew that the
outcome of the measurement of L2 had been c, then you would never find that outcome to
be surprising if you were told that it had actually been R1 which had been measured at R.
Which measurement was done at R has no effect on the outcome of a measurement made
at L.
However, this meaning of LOC1, although certainly true in quantum mechanics, is in-
sufficient to derive his conclusion, since it demands that L1 had actually been measured and
had the given outcome. It ties the meaning of this locality assumption to the actuality of
the measurement and its outcome. This does not allow counter-factual replacement of for
example L, since the truth of this statement is, under this interpretation tied to the truth of
the measurement of the attribute L1 actually having been carried out on L, and on having
obtained that specific outcome.
Another possible meaning, is that if we carried out another experiment in which we kept
all of the conditions on the experiment the same (except the outcomes of the measurements
and which measurement we made at R) then we would obtain the same value for L2. This
interpretation is clearly wrong about quantum mechanics, since the outcome of any mea-
surement is a random process under-determined by the conditions of the experiment, unless
that outcome is a certainty.
Finally, and this is what I suspect Stapp means, this statement could be taken to mean
that if one is somehow able to infer that L2 has value c, then it remains true that L2 has
value c under replacement of R1 with R2 even if the outcomes of the measurement made of
R1 was crucial in drawing the inference that L2 has value c. This interpretation of LOC1
is, I would argue a form of realism, in that it claims that the value to be ascribed to L2 is
independent of the evidence used to determine that value. Clearly this is true of a hidden
variables theory, in which L2 has a value independent of any evidence used to determine
that value. The evidence simply reveals the value. However, I would however claim that
under this interpretation, LOC1 is not true of quantum mechanics. If the value obtained in
a measurement of R2 was crucial in determining that L2 had value c, then R2 cannot be
replaced by R1, even if it is causally disconnected or comes later in time. If the measurement
of R2 was not necessary (logically) in determining the value of L2, then of course the acausal
relation also makes the value of L2 physically independent of R2 and it can be replaced by
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R1 without changing the conclusion that L2 has value c.
Since this is key to my argument below, let me restate this. In quantum theory, one
can determine the value of an operator in many ways. One can directly measure that value
(where the term “measure” is taken as a primitive of the theory of quantum interpretation)
or one can infer that that value because one has dynamically correlated that system (in this
case the L particle) with some other system (a measuring apparatus) and then measured
something on that second system. (This is the essence of the von Neuman analysis, where
he showed that under certain conditions, the second type of measurement with an apparatus
was equivalent in its predictions with the first type.) In the example examined by Stapp,
there are two possible meanings to the term L2 ∧ c (σLx = +). One can either directly
measure the value of L2 (σLx) and find it to be c (+), or one can, because of the correlations
between the two particles, regard R as a measuring apparatus for L. Obtaining the value g
(+) for R2(σRθ) can then be used to infer the value of c (+) for L2 (σLX). In the former case,
the value of L2 obtained by the measurement is clearly independent of which measurements
are carried out in the causally disconnected region, and LOC1 applies. If however the value
of L2 is only inferred from the value obtained from the “measuring apparatus” R, then that
value is clearly not independent of the measuring apparatus, R. Ie, if in LOC1 the value
obtained for L2 (σLX)is inferred from some measurement on R, then LOC1 is false, no matter
what the causal relation is between L and R.
(2)QM : (L2 ∧R2 ∧ g)⇒ (L2 ∧ R2 ∧ c) (11)
This is to encompass the claim that if we know that both L2 (σLX) and R2 (σRθ) were
measured, and we know that R2 had value g (+), then L2 must have had value c (+). It
is however important to note that this statement can have two possible interpretations. In
one the value of c for L2 was inferred from the initial state and the measured value of R2,
while in the other case L2 was measured and actually found to have value c. In that case
the ⇒ must be interpreted as ’it is consistent with’ rather than ’it is inferred that’.
(3)QM : (L2 ∧R1 ∧ c)⇒ (L2 ∧R1 ∧ f) (12)
This is a similar statement to the previous onei for a different implication which can be
drawn from the Hardy state.
(4)LOGIC : (L2 ∧ R2 ∧ g)⇒ (R1✷→ (L2 ∧R1 ∧ f) (13)
The claim is that this arises solely by logic out of the substitution of (2) and (3) into
(1). However it is now clear that the meanings ascribed to LOC1 and to the statements in
the logical calculus arecrucial. To fill in the steps of this reasoning, I get
(L2 ∧R2 ∧ g)⇒ L2 ∧ c ∧R2 ∧ g)⇒ (L2 ∧ c ∧ R2) (14)
⇒ (R1✷→ (R2 ∧ L2 ∧ c)→ L2 ∧ c ∧R1⇒ L2 ∧ c ∧ R1 ∧ f ⇒ L2 ∧ R1 ∧ f
There are now a number of meanings which can be attached to this sequence of statements.
In the first, L2 is assumed to have value c only as an inference drawn from the fact
that R2 had value g. L2 is not independently measured and found to have value c. Thus
the third step in this expansion does not now follow since L2 has value c only because R2
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has value g. Within quantum mechanics, one cannot assume the truth of a statement (L2
has value c) independent of the evidence for that statement (R2 has value g). One cannot
therefor use LOC1 to replace R2 by R1, since one no longer has any independent evidence
that L2 has value c. Were there some independent evidence for the value of L2 (a direct
measurement, or a correlation between L2 and some other system such that knowing the
outcome for that other system would imply the value for L2) then one could use LOC1 to
carry out the (counter-factual) replacement of R2 with R1.
The second interpretation of this statement is that L2 has actually been measured at L. If
L2 was actually measured, than the first four inferences follow, but o the last inference is no
longer true. The fact that L2 was measured and had value c and that R1 was measured and
had value f does not imply that L2 was measured and that R1 was measured and had value
f independent of the value measured for L2. The truth of R1 having value f is an inference
drawn from the actually measured value of L2, and is not itself an independently measured
value (it could not be since R1 is counterfactual). Just as in my previous comments about
LOC1, the value associated with R1 cannot be seperated from the evidence used to ascribe
that value to it, as the last inference attempts to do (ie, it claims that counterfactual R1
has value f even if it is not asserted that L2 has value c, but only that L2 was measured).
Again, it is the fact that in quantum mechanics there is a difference between the value
of an attribute as inferred from the value of some other attribute, and the value as directly
measured which breaks this logical chain. Stapp must use the independence of the value of
an attribute from the way in which that value was inferred to carry through his argument.
His logical calculus does not distinguish between the various ways a value for an attribute
can be determined, and thus assumes that that value is independent of that determination,
an unwarranted assumption in quantum theory, and at least for me, an assumption of realism
for the value of an attribute.
It is on this expression (or rather on a slight rewriting of this expression) that Stapp now
uses LOC2.
(5)LOGIC : (L2)⇒ (R2 ∧ g ⇒ R1✷→ R1 ∧ f) (15)
This is a rewriting of (4). Again however, this expression does not capture the essence of
(1),(2), and (3) where it would only be the fact of L2 actually having been measured to
have the value c which allows us to make these inferences, and not simply that L2 has been
inferred to have value c from measurements made on R2, or that R1 had value f inferred
from the measured value of c for L2. It would be true if the proposition (L2) were replaced
with (L2 ∧ c), where this would be interpreted as “L2 actually having been measured and
found to have value c” but this would again not allow him to use his LOC2 to draw his
ultimate conclusion.
(6)LOC2 : (L1)⇒ (R2 ∧ g ⇒ R1✷→ R1 ∧ f) (16)
This is the statement that if one has derived some expression about R which is true, then
that expression should be independent of what it is that has been measured on the left
hand side (e.g., that measurement on the left hand side could have been made long after
whatever measurement had been made on the right.) However this neglects the fact that
the inference was made entirely based not only on the fact that L2 was measured on the
left, but also that the value obtained for L2 was in fact the value c. If R2 was measured,
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then R1 was not in fact measured. The whole basis for the inference that R1 had value f is
that L2 was measured to have value c. Again, if the value of R1 were something which was
real, something which had an existence independent of the means used to determine what it
was, then this substitution would make sense. But in quantum mechanics, the value is not
independent of the means. The inference of the value of R1 is entirely based on the truth of
the statement that L2 was measured to value c. Thus it is not simply locality which enters
into LOC2 but also some notion of the independent reality of the value of R1, even if it has
not itself been directly measured.
The truth of statement 4 ultimately rests on the additional assumption that the value
of an attribute (eg, R1 (σRz) being f (+)), is independent of the evidence – L2 being g or
σLx = + –which was used to infer that value for R1. R1, being counterfactual, cannot have
actually been measured in some independent way. It’s value is only inferred from the value
obtained for L2, and as such is not independent of that value, even if L2 was only measured
much later. That assumption of independence of value from evidence is, I would claim, the
heart of realism, and is contrary to quantum mechanics.
His analysis does raise interesting issues in our understanding of quantum mechanics. As
mentioned above the von Neuman analysis of the measurement process does assert that one
can use the correlations between systems ( a measuring apparatus and some system one is
measuring) to make statements about the system that is being measured. (If one sees the
pointer on a properly constructed and operating volt meter point to 10V, then one can use
that to infer that the system one is measuring the voltage of has 10V as its value.) To deny
the use of such inferences drawn from such correlations between a measuring apparatus and
the measured system would be to destroy our theory of almost all physical measurements.
However, the Stapp argument shows that one must treat such inferential measurements
carefully. Once one has used the measuring apparatus to infer the value of some measured
quantity, one must keep in mind that that inferred value depends crucially on that process
used to carry out the measurement, and is not independent of that measuring apparatus.
Although usually one can get away with an elimination of the measuring apparatus and re-
garding the inference of a value as being equivalent to the direct measurement of that value
(measurement here being used in its primitive sense in the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics), there are situations, as in these Hardy type experiments, in which such sloppiness
about the meaning of measurement can lead one into error.
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